What's interesting to me about recent U.S. punditry surrounding China's breathtaking ascent is the ever denser linkages being identified between economic growth - facilitated by exponential increases in trans-national information flows, and the changing nature of the strategic environment between two increasingly interdependent continental economies. Last week I flagged up a Nortel--Huawei joint venture in research and development that has potentially serious implications for human security, (see this Rights & Democracy briefing paper, for example).
AEI's Dan Blumenthal asks, What Does China's Economy Mean for U.S. Strategy?. Summarizing A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, (Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon -RAND) he notes,
The crown jewels of American industry--Motorola, Intel, Microsoft--are investing heavily in research and development (R&D) and co-production, helping Beijing to build a world-class communications infrastructure and information technology industry. And it is these commercial technologies, to a much greater extent than generally appreciated, that are being leveraged to form the backbone of China’s modern, networked military force.While not exactly a revelation - (The PLA's desire to develop C4ISR capacity through state-sponsored commercial activity is well documented. Most recently Kathleen Rhem (American Forces Press Service) reports that China appears to be taking a leaf from U.S. RMA doctrine and working toimprove its information warfare capabilities, according to a DoD report on Chinese military power released July 19):While it might lack the journalistic verve of China, Inc., the 2005 report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission provides much-needed analysis of the linkages between China’s investments in science and technology and its geopolitical aspirations. The so-called National High Technology Research and Development Program, the report notes, "was initiated in 1986 as the guiding ideology to focus national policy on key scientific areas to develop technology and ultimately build national power and military strength." For Beijing, in other words, high-tech production has long been linked to its international strategic position.
A senior defense official, speaking onbackground said the Chinese military has a long way to go in C4ISR -- -- but they're clearly doing researchand development into such capabilities. China is also usingadvances in C4ISR to project military power farther from its ownborders. Over the long term, the report states, China's advances inthese areas "could enable Beijing to identify, target, and trackforeign military activities deep into the western Pacific and provide, potentially, hemispheric coverage."-- the Rand report highlights an acceleration in this trend:
According to the Rand researchers, the PLA is successfully executing "the wholesale shift to digital, secure communications via fiber optic cable, satellite, microwave, and encrypted high-frequency radio." The secret of its success, Rand argues, is an approach it terms "the digital triangle"--an alliance among China’s booming commercial information technology companies, the state R&D infrastructure and the military. Under the digital triangle, private Chinese companies such as Huawei are designated “national champions,” allowing them to receive lines of credit from state banks as well as funding and staff from the military and state research institutions. The military, in turn, benefits as a favored customer and research partner. National champions also enjoy "infusions of near state-of-the-art foreign technology, thanks to the irresistible siren song of China’s huge information technology (IT) market, which encourages foreign companies to transfer cutting edge technology for the promise of market access." Among the main foreign partners of Huawei, for instance, are Motorola, IBM, Intel, Altera, Agere, Sun, Microsoft, Texas Instruments and NEC.The linchpin that companies such as Huawei form between foreign firms on the one hand and the Chinese military and state R&D institutes on the other is an example of what the Rand authors characterize as China’s new approach to weapons building: "civilianization," or the use of civilian entities to conduct military research. According to the Rand researchers, the tripartite arrangement has proved mutually beneficial to the PLA’s C4ISR program and the country’s commercial IT sector: "While it is true that the Chinese IT industry is commercially oriented, the research and financial apparatus underlying its success derives significantly from state research and development institutes, including those affiliated with the defense industry and military units. In this sense, the information-technology sector, particularly those firms supplying finished C4ISR and related products to the PLA could be seen as a new defense-industrial sector in China. . . ."
